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Dulka: Evidence

RAISING THE STANDARD FOR EXPERT
TESTIMONY: AN UNWARRANTED
OBSTACLE IN PROVING CLAIMS OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE IN DEPENDENCY
HEARINGS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past 10 years, there has been a dramatic increase in
awareness of the problem of child sexual abuse, 1 which has led
to an increase in the number of reported cases. 2 The investigations of these reported cases frequently indicate that legal intervention is necessary to protect the physical and emotional health
of the child at risk. Child advocates have found themselves enmeshed in an evidentiary quagmire regarding the admissibility
of testimony of expert witnesses who offer their opinions of
whether or not the alleged abuse actually occurred.
How the courts would choose to characterize this testimony-that is, whether it constituted "expert opinion" or "scientific evidence"-would ultimately determine its admissibility.
And, given the difficulties inherent in proving claims of child
sexual abuse,S any characterization which would preclude or sig1. Sexual abuse includes both sexual assault and sexual exploitation of minors. The
abuse can involve many incidents over a long period of time or a single act. Sexual as·
sault includes: rape, incest, sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts, oral copulation, and penetration of a genital or anal opening by a foreign object. J. VAN DE KAMP, CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION HANDBOOK 9 (1985).
2. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, SEXUAL ABUSE: A LIFELONG LEGACY (1986). "The
Department of Justice reports that 23,663 cases of sexual abuse were investigated in
1985, more than twice as many as in 1982." [d. at 2. Researchers do not believe that
there has been a significant increase in the incidence of child sexual abuse. D. EDWARDS,
BREAKING THE CYCLE, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3-4
(1986). Rather it is believed that heightened awareness has led to an increase in the
number of cases reported to authorities who investigate such reports. [d. See also S.
FORWARD & C. BUCK, BETRAYAL OF INNOCENCE, INCEST AND ITS DEVASTATION 3 (1978). The
increase is due in part to California law which requires that professionals working with
children who either know or have reason to suspect that a child is a victim of abuse must
report this information. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West Supp. 1988).
3. J. VAN DE KAMP, supra note 1, at 55. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
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nificantly hamper admissibility would also drastically impede
the goals of legal intervention.
The issue of how to characterize the testimony of experts
was addressed by the court in In Re Amber B.' and its extension, In Re Christine C.r, The county alleged that the father had
sexually abused three-year old Amber and that her sister, oneyear old Teela, was at risk. At a dependency hearing, the court
granted the county's petition to have the child declared a dependent of the court. The primary evidence was offered by a courtappointed psychologist who provided expert testimony that Amber had been sexually abused. 6 The opinion of the psychologist
was based on the nature of Amber's disclosure of abuse, the
ways in which she described the instances of abuse, and observations of Amber with anatomical dolls.
In an earlier case, this type of testimony had been admissible as expert opinion to determine whether or not the child had
been sexually abused. 7 However, the appellate court in Amber B.
held that the evidence was scientific evidence and not admissible
as expert opinion. s As scientific evidence, the proponent of the
evidence must establish that the scientific process has been generally accepted as reliable within the scientific community from
which it was developed. 9 As expert opinion, the evidence only
has to be of the type that experts would reasonably rely upon in
forming such an opinion.1o The Amber court raised the standard
AND THE LAW 166 (1982) (general resource guide on legal issues encountered in child
sexual abuse cases).
4. 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1987), rev. denied (July 30, 1987).
5. 191 Cal. App. 3d. 676, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1987), rev. denied (July 30, 1987). The
decision in Christine C. was based on the court's holding in Amber B. and, therefore, this
note will concentrate on the court's holding and reasoning in Amber B. and the impact it
will have on dependency hearings in California.
6. The court-appointed psychologist based his opinion on: three one-hour sessions
with Amber, during which Amber "stuck her fingers 'vigorously' inside the doll's vagina
and anus, and twisted her fingers back and forth ... ;" an interview of Amber's mother; a
review of the police report; the dependency petition and the assessment report. Brief for
Respondent at 4, Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623.
7. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984).
8. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
9. [d. at 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26. This standard of general acceptance is known
as the Kelly-Frye test. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966); see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text (discussion of statute stating requirements for expert witnesses).
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of admissibility, increasing the already difficult task of proving
claims of child sexual abuse.
Evidentiary problems are aggravated by the nature of child
sexual abuse. The perpetrator is often a family member;l1 often
there is no physical evidence;12 and the child may be too younglS
or traumatized to testify. a As a result, mental health professionals have come to play an increasingly important role as expert
witnesses in these cases. 111 In detecting and validating claims of
child sexual abuse, mental health professionals often observe the
child with anatomical dolls and analyze any reports of abuse
that the child makes. 16 They utilize this information in their
testimony.
This comment will examine the Amber B. court's decision to
characterize this evidence provided by the mental health professionals as scientific evidence and not as expert opinion. Secondly, this comment will explore the desirability of imposing the
scientific evidence standard, usually applied in criminal cases, to
dependency hearings. Finally, this comment will discuss the implications of the Amber B. decision in light of the already present evidentiary difficulties of proving child sexual abuse claims
and the social policy of protecting the welfare of the abused
child.
II. ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN
PROVING CLAIMS OF CHILD SEXUL ABUSE
Each case of suspected child sexual abuse which is reported
must be investigated by local law enforcement agencies or by
11. D. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 96 "[R]esearch has indicated that up to 50% of all
reported cases of child sexual abuse involve sexual activity between family
members . . . . "
12. THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH (L. Schultz ed. 1980) [hereinafter Schultz]
"[N]o more than 5 to 10 percent of sexual abuse involves physical injury. . . . " Id. at 40.
13. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussion of competence of
young children as witnesses).
14. Yates, Should Young Children Testify in Cases of Sexual Abuse?, 144 AM. J. OF
PSYCHIATRY 476, 478 (1987) (trauma to the child witness may be the result of guilt over
the harm the testimony does to a family member, guilt of having participated in a crime,
fear of being jailed or otherwise punished and the horror of reliving the events).
15. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
16. An anatomical doll set typically includes adult male and female dolls and boy
and girl dolls, with genitalia including penetrable body orifices such as the mouth, vagina
and anus.
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county child protective service agencies. 17 Because of the increase in the number of abuse cases reported, the task of validating claims of child sexual abuse is frequently delegated to
mental health professionals. 18
The information obtained by mental health professionals is
then used in the legal proceedings which follow. If it is determined that the child is in danger of further abuse in the family
setting,19 civil proceedings20 can be brought to have the child declared a dependent of the court under section 300 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. 21 Once the child has been declared a dependent of the court, the court has a range of options
17. J. VAN DE KAMP, supra note I, at 2.
18. San Jose Mercury News, May 18, 1987, at 12A, col. 1. Mental health profession-

als, as used in this comment refer to psychiatrists, psychologists, licensed clinical social
workers and licensed marriage, family, and child counselors.
19. Distinction should be made between incest (sexual activity between persons who
are blood-related) and intrafamilial contact (sexual activity between family members not
related by blood). Rape is considered forced oral, anal or vaginal penetration, usually by
an unknown perpetrator. J. VAN DE KAMP, supra note I, at 11.
20. Petition is usually filed by the county child welfare department, and in some
counties by the probation department. The probation officer or social worker filing the
claim is often appointed guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child. [d. at
46.

21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1987) (operative until Jan. 1, 1989),
which applied in Amber B., provided that minors under the following descriptions could
be declared dependents of the court:
(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him or her by reason of
neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of either of his or
her parents, or of his or her guardian or other person in whose
custody or care he or she is.
(e) Who is under the age of three and whose home is an unfit
place for him or her as a result of severe physical abuse of the
minor by a parent, or by any person known by the parent. . . . For the purpose of this section, "severe physical
abuse" means any of the following ... any single act of sexual
abuse which causes significant bleeding, deep bruising, or significant external or internal swelling. . . .
Section 300 (operative Jan. 1, 1989) and section 300 (operative Jan. 1, 1990) include a
statement of Legislative intent to provide maximum protection for children who are sexually abused and specifically incorporates into the description of minors who may be
declared dependents of the court:
(d) The minor has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will be sexually abused, as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 11165 of the Penal Code ... or the
parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the minor
f~om sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was in danger of
sexual abuse.
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to protect the child: from removing the child from the home to
leaving the child in the parents' care under court supervision. 22
In addition to civil proceedings, the information obtained may
be used if criminal charges are brought against an alleged
perpetrator. 28
There are many difficulties encountered in proving claims of
child sexual abuse. The child victim is frequently the only witness to the abuse. 24 As a witness, the competency of the child is
often a major issue, although California courts have given liberal
interpretation to Evidence Code section 701, which governs the
competency of witnesses. 211 Generally the child is only disqualified as incompetent if he or she is incapable of expressing himself or herself or incapable of understanding the duty of the witness to tell the truth. 28 Even if the child is competent, his or her
credibility as a witness is still suspect, especially if the child is
very young. 27
22. The dependency hearing involve two stages. At the jurisdictional stage, the court
determines by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the child comes within one of
the categories of § 300. The second stage is the the dispositional phase and requires clear
and convincing evidence to remove the child from the custody of the parent. In re Cheryl
H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1112, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 797 (1984). Short of removing the
child from the parent, the court can order the dependent child to remain at home under
the supervision of the child welfare services or probation department. J. VAN DE KAMP,
supra note 1, at 46; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West Supp. 1988) (removal
of child from home) and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 360(a) (West Supp. 1988) (supervised custody).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(g) (West Supp. 1988) requires cross reports from the
child protection agency to the district attorney. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1
(West Supp. 1988) which defines sexual abuse as sexual assault (rape, incest, sodomy,
lewd or lascivious acts, oral copulation, penetration of a genital or anal opening by a
foreign object, intentional touching of the child's genitals or clothing covering them, and
masturbation in the presence of a child) and sexual exploitation (child pornography and
prostitution).
24. J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 164-65 (1981).
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 701(a) (West Supp. 1988) states:
A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is: (1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so
as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation
by one who can understand him; or (2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.
26.Id.
27. See Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross Examination and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801 (1987) (comprehensive article on children
witnesses with specific techniques for supporting and attacking their credibility, including a section on cross examining a child who has testified using anatomical dolls); YATES,
supra note 14, at 478 (author states that it is not known whether the child can distinguish his or her own thoughts about another person's actions from that person's real
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In addition, the experience of testifying can be very traumatic for the child. 28 In cases of intrafamilial sexual abuse, the
incidents of abuse are likely to be shrouded in secrecy and involve a family member.29 Recent legislation has been enacted in
an attempt to protect the child witness. 30 But even with these
legislative protections, the testimony of the child is often inadequate in proving that the abuse occurred. Furthermore, because
there is often a substantial time lag between the incidence of
abuse and disclosure, there is seldom sufficient physical evidence
to support the claim of sexual abuse. 31
The lack of direct evidence and the absence of corroborating
physical evidence makes the role played by the mental health
professional crucial in validating claims of child sexual abuse.
This is especially true when the child is very young and unable
to testify.32 In factual situations like Amber B., the testimony of
the expert may be the only significant evidence available. 33 Even
when the child is able to testify, testimony by the expert has
been useful to validate and give credibility to the child's testimony, as well as to dispel any misconceptions and myths the
court and jury might have about child sexual abuse. 34
actions, particularly when an oedipal-age child attributes sexual iritent to a parent).
28. See supra note 14. See also Tedesco & Schnell, Children's Reactions to Sex
Abuse Investigations and Litigation, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 267, 271 (children
required to testify in court viewed process as harmful).
29. D. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 12, 91 (between 75-85% of child abusers are known
to their victims prior to the first incidence of abuse).
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 861.5 (postponement of preliminary hearing to accommodate child witness); § 868.5 (family member may accompany child to the witness
stand); § 868.6 (nonthreatening environment for minor witness); § 868.8 (special precautions for child molestation victims) (West Supp. 1988).
31. See SHULTZ, supra note 12, at 40.
32. "Toddlers and school-age children have difficulty verbalizing fears and concerns.
They are likely, however, to present physical and behavioral signs and symptoms." Id. at
47.
33. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691-92, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629-30 (1987).
34. Expert testimony has been admitted regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome [hereinafter CSAASj. The syndrome describes the supposed typical behavior of sexually abused children involving one or more of five elements: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed disclosure and retraction. Summit,
The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177
(1983). See People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986) (expert testimony regarding CSAAS delayed reporting admissible, and Kelly-Frye not applied, as
long as purpose was not to prove that abuse had in fact occurred, but to rehabilitate
claimant's credibility and to educate the jury about widely held misconceptions about
child sexual abuse); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985)
(court permitted testimony based on CSAAS to rehabilitate the victim's credibility and
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Anatomical dolls are recently developed tools which assist
mental health professionals in validating claims of child sexual
abuse.3~ The dolls are used as a means of aiding children in accurately relating their sexual knowledge and experience. 36 The
premise behind the use of these dolls is that the child will use
them in making a spontaneous disclosure of an abuse experience
with minimal direction and encouragement. 37 The dolls are particularly useful with very young children who lack verbal skills
to relate their sexual knowledge and experiences. 38
The use of anatomical dolls in proving claims of child sexual
abuse was examined by the court in Amber B. The court held
that the testimony of mental health professionals based on their
observation of the child with the anatomical dolls and their
analysis of the child's reporting of abuse was not merely evidence offered as expert opinion. 39 Instead, the court found their
observations and analyses to be the result of scientific processes,
and therefore, required stricter scrutiny before being admitted
as evidence. '0
III. APPLYING THE KELLY-FRYE TEST IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
On appeal, the primary issue in Amber B. was whether the
did not apply Kelly-Frye); In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1984) (although specific evidence based on CSAAS was not offered, expert was permit·
ted to testify generally on symptoms of sexually abused children); People v. Dunnahoo,
152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1984) (experts permitted to testify to bolster
victims' credibility). But see cases cited infra note 90 (testimony based on CSAAS inadmissible when offered for purposes other than to rehabilitate the credibility of the
victim).
35. Anatomical dolls were originally created in 1976 by Marsha Morgan and Virginia
Friedemann. Telephone interview with Marsha Morgan (October 30, 1987); see B. BOAT
& M. EVERSON, USING ANATOMICAL DOLLS: GUIDELINES FOR INTERVIEWING YOUNG CHILDREN IN SEXUAL ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS (1986) (training manual for the use of anatomical
dolls); V. FRIEDEMANN, INTERVIEWING SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS USING ANATOMICAL DOLLS:
THE PROFESSIONAL GUIDEBOOK (1983) (training manual for the use of anatomical dolls);
CHILD GUIDANCE CENTER, YOUNG SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS: AN INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (1986)
(video and guidebook training for interviewing children with anatomical dolls, available
by contacting P.O. Box 45145, Cleveland, OH 44145).
36. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 3.
37. The methods used in employing anatomical dolls vary, but generally include several sessions with the child in which the professional builds rapport with the child, assesses the child's understanding and observes the child at play with the dolls. [d. at 3.
38. [d. at 1.
39. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d. 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987).
40. [d.
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techniques employed by the psychologist in detecting child sexual abuse were admissible as expert testimony or were new scientific methods of proof which would have to satisfy the KellyFrye test of admissibility.·l The Kelly-Frye rule as stated by the
Amber B. court requires that "evidence based on a new scientific
method of proof is admissible only upon a showing that the procedure has been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific
community in which it was developed.""2 In addition to showing
that the process has been generally accepted, proponents must
also show that the process was conducted using the correct scientific procedures and that the person administering the test
was properly qualified.· 8
The Kelly-Frye test focuses on the reliability of the method
in the community in which it was developed. The reliability is
established by a showing of general acceptance in the community." General acceptance of the method can be demonstrated
by the amount of research conducted in the field, the scientific
literature on the subject and the existence of cases in which testimony based on the new theory has been admitted."!! The burden of establishing the reliability of the method and the proper
qualifications of the witness rests on the party offering the evi41. See cases cited supra note 9.
42. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
43. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976) (court held scientific evidence must meet three part test: 1) method generally
accepted as reliable, 2) expert witness properly qualified, and 3) correct procedure used
by expert witness); see also People v. Dellinger, 163 Cal. App. 3d 284, 293-95, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 503, 508-09 (1984) (admission of evidence relating to anthropomorthic dummy in a
criminal case to prove the child did not sustain fatal injuries from falling down stairs
held to be prejudicial error because it failed to meet the three-prong Kelly-Frye test);
see generally WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, §§ 864-900 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1987).
44. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (the court's task
is not to determine accuracy of the proffered scientific technique but to show a scientific
consensus supporting the use).
45. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 530, 726 P. 2d 516, 523, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 841
(1985) (court may look beyond the trial record and examine California precedent, cases
from other jurisdictions and scientific literature to determine whether the evidence
meets the Kelly-Frye test); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 56, 641 P.2d 775, 797, 181
Cal. Rptr. 243, 267 (1982) (in meeting the Kelly-Frye test, scientists are permitted to
speak to the court through published writing such as treatises and journals as evidence
of a technique'S general acceptance as reliable); see also United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541, 555 (1977) (amount of research conducted in field); United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463, 465-66 (1975) (number of cases that admitted testimony based on new theory);
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (1970) (number of articles written on the
subject).
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dence. 48 A single expert witness would not be sufficient to represent the views of the scientific community regarding
reliability.47
If evidence based on the use of anatomical dolls is offered as

the product of a scientific process, it is doubtful that such evidence will pass the Kelly-Frye test. Although the use of such
dolls is already widespread within the mental health community,48 their use is relatively new. There are not, as yet, standardized guidelines by which to use anatomical dolls, nor is
there definitive data regarding the interpretation of the information obtained from a child's interaction with the dolls. 49 Another
problem in meeting the Kelly-Frye test as a scientific process
exists in determining who would be qualified to administer the
process. There is no consensus among mental health professionals as to the level of training and professional education which
should be required of someone utilizing anatomical dolls.1IO The
dolls have been used by a range of professionals, such as police
officers, nurses, social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists.
Many are not properly trained in the use of the dolls:u Although
there are several training manuals that provide guidelines for
the use of anatomical dolls, there is no generally accepted scien46. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 36-40, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248-50, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
152-54 (1976); see also Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 54, 641 P.2d at 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265;
People v. Roehler, 167 Cal. App. 3d 353, 213 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1985).
47. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152. To ensure impartiality, the proponent of the evidence should use different experts to establish that the
scientific method is generally accepted than those experts that are used to testify regarding the application of the technique in that particular case. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 533, 726
P. 2d at 525, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (credentialed forensic technicians who offered evidence regarding genetic analyses of dried fluid and stain samples from victim's body in
rape case were not qualified to give the view of relevant community of impartial scientists because of their affiliation with law enforcement officials in the case).
48. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 1.
49. [d. at 29. See Jampole and Weber, An Assessment of Behavior of Sexually
Abused Children with Anatomically Correct Dolls, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 187-88
(1987) (article notes common use of anatomical dolls but cautions the need to crosscheck any interpretation of a child's behavior with the dolls with other observational
data since empirical research regarding anatomical dolls is new and limited).
50. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35 at 29.
51. "It is therefore imperative that individuals using anatomical dolls in child sexual
abuse investigations obtain adequate training." [d. at 3; see Pinkney v. Clay County, 635
F. Supp. 1079 (D. Minn. 1986) (in a civil rights action arising from investigation and
prosecution of child sexual abuse claims, court found law enforcement officials not properly trained with anatomical dolls to offer expert testimony based on their observations).
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tific procedure to be followed. 1I2 Furthermore, many experts in
the field do not view the dolls as a scientific process, but instead,
as tools utilized by the clinician to facilitate a better understanding of their child clients. liS
The inadmissibility of this evidence will have a significant
impact on the ability to place young children, who cannot testify, under the protection of the court. In both Amber B. and
Christine C., the admission of testimony by the expert was considered by the court to be erroneous because the expert utilized
anatomical dolls in forming his opinion. This error was found to
be harmless in Christine C. because the children testified and
their testimony was believable. 1I4 In Amber B., the error was not
harmless. Three-year old Amber was unable to testify and there
was no other significant evidence besides the testimony of the
psychologist. 1I11 On remand, the district attorney dismissed the
dependency petition and Amber and her sister were returned to
the sole custody of their parents. liS Prior to Amber B., the courts
allowed this evidence as expert opinion. Why did the court find
it necessary to redefine this evidence as the product of a scientific process and, as a result, categorically exclude this important
evidence?
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
AND SCIENTIFIC PROCESS

EXPERT OPINION

Prior to Amber B., expert opinion that a child had been sexually abused was admitted, following the court's holding in In
re Cheryl H.1I7 Cheryl H. was a dependency hearing in which a
psychiatrist offered her opinion that the child had been abused.
The court found that the psychiatrist's education, knowledge
and experience qualified her to draw inferences about whether
or not the child had been sexually abused. liB This expertise, be52. See B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 29.
53. Telephone interview with Barbara Boat, Ph.D. (October 30, 1987); see B. BOAT
& M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 29.
54. In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 680, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 (1987).
55. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987).
56. Telephone interview with Thomas H. Gordinier, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent in Amber B. (Aug. 27, 1987).
57. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984).
58. The court limited the testimony to the issue of whether or not the child had
been abused and not whether a particular individual had committed the acts. [d. at 1116,
200 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800. The court excluded the opinion of the psychiatrist that the
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ing beyond common experience that would assist the trier of
fact, allowed the witness to offer her opinion as an expert under
the Evidence Code section 801. 119 Section 801(b) requires that
the expert opinion be:
[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training and education)
perceived by or personally known to the witness
or made known to him at or before the hearing,
whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in
forming an opinion upon the subject to which his
testimony relates . . . .60

The psychiatrist in Cheryl H. based her opinion on: 1) observing the child with anatomical dolls, 2) the manner in which
the child disclosed the abuse by using new slang terms for genitalia' and 3) observing behavior which demonstrated anxiety
symptoms characteristic of sexually abused children. 6 } The court
found that the data used by the expert witness was proper matter on which to base such an opinion.62 By allowing the testifather had committed the abuse because it was considered to be an impermissible inference about the conduct of a third party based on hearsay. [d. See In re Christina T., 184
Cal. App. 3d 630, 640, 229 Cal. Rptr. 247, 253 (1986) (court held that although the identity of the perpetrator was relevant to the placement of the child, it was not relevant to
whether the court should invoke jurisdiction to protect the child, and, therefore, the
court could declare the child a dependent of the court without identifying the
perpetrator).
59. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 1966).
60. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966); see Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1118,
200 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (It is not enough that an inference be beyond common experience;
the expert opinion must assist the trier of fact.)
61. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116-18, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01; see supra note
34 for discussion of CSAAS.
62. The court found that the expert's testimony regarding Cheryl's statements and
conduct with the anatomical dolls was not hearsay, because her statements were not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but as the basis for the expert's opinion.
Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 801. The court also held that most
of the conduct and statements on which the expert opinions were based were independently admissible. The conduct by the child was considered to be nonassertive and,
therefore, not hearsay. The evidence concerning the anatomical dolls was relevant to
infer that the child had been exposed to inappropriate sexual conduct. [d. at 1126, 200
Cal. Rptr. at 807. Other jurisdictions have dealt with the hearsay issue of admitting expert testimony of the child's reports of sexual abuse and have admitted testimony of the
child's conduct and statements while using the anatomical dolls without applying the
Kelly-Frye test. See In re C. L., 397 N.W.2d 81 (S.D. 1986) (court held that the spontaneous reaction of a six-year old to anatomical dolls and maneuvering of the dolls to
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mony under section 801 as expert opinion, the Cheryl H. court
used a standard of admissibility that required that the manner
utilized in basing the opinion be of a type that may be reasonably relied upon in forming such an opinion. The Amber B. court
modified the Cheryl H. holding by labeling the basis of such
opinions as scientific processes requiring Kelly-Frye. 63 This
characterization replaced the reasonable reliance standard with
a much stricter standard of general acceptance in the scientific
community.
The Amber B. court decided that the Cheryl H. holding had
to be reconsidered primarily because of the subsequent criminal
case, People v. Bledsoe.6" In Bledsoe, the court applied the
Kelly-Frye test to evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome.6~ The
Amber B. court found Bledsoe to be analogous because both
cases involved expert testimony based on psychological analysis
of behavior.66 The Bledsoe court did not provide any analysis of
why Rape Trauma Syndrome was considered a scientific process
but simply relied on People v. Shirley.67 In Shirley, testimony
based on the use of hypnotically aided recall was subjected to
perform sexual acts was not hearsay but relevant and admissible evidence); In re M.E.,
715 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (court held that testimony of Family Services staff
regarding observations of children with anatomical dolls was not hearsay, but admissible
to show unusually superim sexual knowledge to infer some sort of sexual abuse had occurred but not necessarily to identify perpetrator); In re Penelope B., 104 Wash. 2d 643,
709 P. 2d 1185 (1985) (court held that testimony of therapists as to their observation of
the child's conduct and demeanor during play with anatomical dolls was admissible as
nonassertive conduct and not hearsay and therefore appropriate for inclusion in hypothetical question given to psychiatric expert); D.A.H. v. G.A.H., 371 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (court held that psychologist's testimony of child's statement made in a session using anatomical dolls and psychologist's testimony based on an abuse counselor's
report were admissible under the "catch-all" exception to hearsay rule because of the
guarantee of reliability and trustworthiness of the testimony).
63. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d. 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987).
64. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (in a
criminal case where the defendant was convicted of forcibly raping a 14-year-old girl,
court held that evidence offered by the prosecution regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome
was erroneously admitted).
65. Evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome-a spectrum of physical, psychological and
emotional reactions of rape victims was offered by the prosecution to prove a rape occurred. [d. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr at 457-58. The court applied the
Kelly-Frye standard and then concluded that Rape Trauma Syndrome failed the test
because it was not generally accepted as a means of determining whether a rape occurred, but as a therapeutic tool to assist counselors. [d. at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203
Cal. Rptr at 459.
66. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 687-88, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
67. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
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the Kelly-Frye test. 6S
Shirley and Bledsoe did not define scientific process; nor
did these cases set forth guidelines for determining when KellyFrye would apply to psychological evidence. 69 While the Amber
B. court found Shirley and Bledsoe to be persuasive, it admitted
that the answer to the question of whether the psychologist simply provided expert testimony or utilized a scientific process was
"elusive."70 The court stated that there was little guidance for
determining at what point evidence transcends expert testimony
and becomes scientific proof.71 The court further noted that the
task is particularly difficult when it involves psychological analysis of behavior. 72 The court rejected the idea that the determination should be made upon factors pertaining to the nature of the
challenged procedure. 7s Instead, the court decided that the underlying purpose behind Kelly-Frye should determine whether
the test is required or not." The court quoted People v. McDonald in stating that the underlying purpose was to prevent the
factfinder "from being misled by the 'aura of infallibility' that
may surround unproven scientific methods.1I711 As a result, the
Amber B. court held that the Kelly-Frye test applied to psychological evidence whenever the factfinder would tend to ascribe
an inordinately high degree of certainty to the evidence. 76

In McDonald, however, the court did not take such a broad
approach in applying Kelly-Frye, but instead recognized the importance of distinguishing between expert testimony and scientific evidence." In addressing the issue of whether Kelly-Frye
68. [d. at 53, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264. The court stated without elaboration, "[w)e do not doubt that if testimony based on a new scientific process operating
on purely psychological evidence were to be offered in our courts, it would likewise be
subjected to the Frye standard of admissibility." [d. Evidence based on hypnotically
aided recall did not meet the test because of what the court considered to be a lack of
consensus within scientific literature on the subject. [d.
69. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 688, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
70. [d. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629 (quoting People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372, 690

P.2d 709, 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 250-51 (1984».
76. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 690-91, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
77. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 25051.
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should be applied to psychological evidence involving cross-racial identification in line-ups, the court stated that expert testimony can be tempered by healthy skepticism, but that "the opposite may be true when the evidence is produced by a
machine: ... apparently 'scientific' mechanism, instrument, or
procedure."78 The court in McDonald was not persuaded that
Kelly-Frye would apply.79
The Amber B. court acknowledged that the Kelly-Frye test
has been used primarily for "novel devices or processes involving
the manipulation of physical evidence, such as lie detectors, experimental systems of blood typing, voiceprints, identification
by human bite marks. . . . "80 The court noted that the few
cases that did apply the test to psychological evidence gave little
guidance for determining "at what point evidence based upon a
. psychological analysis of behavior transcends expert testimony
and becomes scientific evidence."81 But, the court side-stepped
the issue by failing to determine what constitutes "scientific evidence. "82 Instead of clarifying the distinctions between scientific
processes and expert opinion, the court tended to blur them
together.
The court should have made a clear distinction between expert opinion and scientific process. The court decided not to
take the direct approach of determining "the presence of a 'new
scientific method of proof based upon factors pertaining to the
nature of the challenged procedure. . . . "8S If the court had, it
would have had a difficult time labeling the use of anatomical
78. Id.
79. Id. at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251. The court stated:
We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical
testimony, even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the
subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past
state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness, or
even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illnes not
listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric
Association.
Id. See People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986) (the court, following McDonald, held that expert testimony regarding CSAAS did not need to meet KellyFrye when offered to rehabilitate claimant's testimony).
80. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
81. Id. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
82. Id. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
83. Id. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
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dolls and analysis of the child's report of abuse as scientific
processes requiring Kelly-Frye. By failing to determine whether
a scientific process exists, but instead focusing on whether the
factfinder would tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of
certainty to the evidence, the court creates a test that is ambiguous and tends to beg the question. Expert testimony is traditionally utilized because the subject matter is beyond the common
experience of the factfinder. s4 The court does not indicate at
what point, beyond that of common experience, the factfinder
would tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty to
the expert testimony.
Experts' opinions based on observing children with anatomical dolls cannot be considered a scientific process in the same
manner as voiceprints or polygraphs. The dictionary defines the
word "scientific" as "systematic or accurate in the manner of an
exact science. "SI) The use of devices that physically manipulate
pieces of data and give quantifiable results fall more clearly into
this definition of scientific process. The use of anatomical dolls
and the analysis of the child's reporting do not. The experts'
opinions in these cases are based on their training, knowledge
and general experience in working with children who have been
sexually abused. s6 The dolls are not a standardized test which
produce quantifiable results. They are the working tools of clinicians which provide relevant insight upon which experts can
base their opinions. s7 As one manual for the use of anatomical
84. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
85. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1179 (rev. ed. 1975). Accord STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 867 & 1140 (5th ed. 1982), which defines "method" as a mode or
manner or orderly sequence of events of a process and defines "process" as a method
used in attainment of a certain result.
86. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 800 (1984)
(psychiatrist's education, knowledge and experience made her familiar with the behavior
typical of children who have been subjected to sexual abuse and allowed her to draw
inferences that were beyond common experience; therefore, of assistance to the finder of
fact).
87. See also In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich. App. 475, 477, 376 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1985)
(a Michigan court rejected the argument that expert testimony based on observations of
the child with anatomical dolls must first meet the Frye standard to be admissible as a
foundation for the expert's opinion that the child was sexually abused because the dolls
were not calculated to elicit a particular result but as tools to permit children to communicate ideas which they are unable to express verbally); In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d 327,
332 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987) (a New York court permitted expert testimony based on anatomical dolls to corroborate child's out-of-court statements, but noted that empirical research is new and limited, and therefore more weight should be given to the experts who
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dolls states:
Anatomical dolls are not magical. Using them in a
sexual abuse investigation does not ensure disclosure nor provide a failsafe method of obtaining
the truth. Instead, they are a highly valuable tool
for facilitating a meaningful exchange with children about their sexual knowledge and experience. . . . The effectiveness of any tool is contingent upon the skill of the user.88

In Amber B. the psychologist's opinion was also based upon
Amber's disclosure of the abuse. 89 It is likely that the expert
based this opinion upon his knowledge of general theories of
child development and his expertise in the assessment and treatment of sexually abused children tailored to the unique situation
of this particular child. But, the court characterized this testimony, not as expert opinion, but as a scientific process requiring
the Kelly-Frye standard of general acceptance. 90 Mental health
professionals might agree that a psychologist could reasonably
rely on the nature of the reporting in forming an opinion that
are professionally qualified in clinical disciplines and have had experience in diagnostic
assessment of child sexual abuse victims).
88. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 3. See also Jampole & Weber supra
note 49, at 192 (the study compared the behavior of sexually abused children and children not sexually abused at play with anatomical dolls and concluded that "anatomical
dolls are a useful instrument in child abuse investigations.")
89. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 685, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1987).
90. [d. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The Amber court distinguished the expert's
analysis of the child's report of abuse from Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome because the witness did not specifically mention the syndrome or its elements.
But the court suggests that evidence based on the syndrome would also be considered a
scientific process and therefore subject to Kelly-Frye. [d. at 690 n.3, 236 Cal. Rptr. at
628 n.3. See also In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1987) (court
held that expert testimony based on "child molest syndrome" must meet the Kelly-Frye
test unless offered for the sole purpose of rehabilitating the victim's credibility and that
the evidence failed to meet the test); Seering v. Department of Social Serv., 194 Cal.
App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1987) (testimony of psychiatrist based on child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome inadmissible for failing to meet Kelly-Frye test); but
see Myers, supra note 27, at 801 (author states that CSAAS is the proper subject for
expert testimony that the child had been abused and to bolster credibility of the victim);
Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial Responses, 15
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 437 (1985) (overview of child sexual abuse legislation); Comment, The Admissibility of "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" in California Criminal Courts, 17 PAC. L.J. 1361 (1986) (advocates the admissibility of CSAAS
in criminal cases and argues that CSAAS should be able to meet the Kelly-Frye test);
see also cases cited supra note 34 (CSAAS admissible to rehabilitate credibility of
victim).
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the child had been sexually abused. But it is doubtful that they
would agree that this particular psychologist's analysis of the
child's reporting was generally acceptable as a reliable scientific
process of diagnosing sexual abuse.
A subsequent case, Seering v. Department of Social Services,sl recognized the difference between an expert's personal
opinion based on his or her own experience and an opinion that
was based upon a scientific process. S2 The Seering court, in rejecting the Amber B. court's broad language, held that subjecting all expert testimony based upon analyses of the child's reports of child sexual abuse to the Kelly-Frye test would severely
limit the ability of experts to present their opinions. s3 The court
reasoned that in most cases it would be impossible to show that
the expert's own personal opinion would be generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community.s4
The Amber B. court labels such testimony as a scientific
process based solely on the tendency of the factfinder to be awed
by the evidence. The court's determination is done without examining the nature of the evidence and without even considering
whether the community which developed the evidence considers
it to be a scientific process. Once labeled as scientific process,
the court will not admit the evidence unless it is shown that the
community from which it was developed generally accepts it as a
reliable scientific process. If that community does not in the first
place consider the evidence to be a scientific process, the evidence can never pass a test of being generally accepted as a reliable scientific method. Therefore, by the court's not considering
the nature of the evidence but instead focusing on the probable
effect it might have on influencing a factfinder, the court categorically excludes the evidence. If the court is going to look to
the scientific community for reliability, it should also look to
that community to determine initially whether the evidence can
be defined as a scientific process.
91. 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (1987).
92. Although testimony of the psychiatrist's own opinion was admitted as expert
opinion, the court adopted the Amber B. analysis in finding that testimony based on
CSAAS must meet the Kelly-Frye test. [d. at 307, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
93. [d. at 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
94. [d.
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The court would have been correct in excluding the evidence based on the anatomical dolls and the analysis of the
child's report if it had been offered as the result of a scientific
process to prove that an abuse had occurred. 911 But the evidence
was not offered for that purpose. It was offered as an explanation of how the expert utilized his knowledge, skill, training and
experience in forming his opinion that the child had been sexually abused. D6
The court was motivated to impose Kelly-Frye out of its
concern that the factfinder would be unduly impressed by expert
opinion based upon unreliable matters.97 But, concerns about
the reliability and trustworthiness of experts' opinions were sufficiently addressed by Cheryl H.98 and the application of Evidence Code section 801(b).99 This statute, which models the
Federal Rules of Evidence,loo requires that the matter relied
upon by the expert in forming his or her opinion be of a type
that reasonably may be relied upon by experts in forming an
opinion upon the subject to which the testimony relates. lol As
the Law Revision Commission comment following the statute
states: "In a large measure, this assures the reliability and trustworthiness of the information used by experts in forming their
opinion."102 The statute provides adequate safeguards without
the additional requirements of Kelly-Frye.
V. APPLYING
HEARINGS

KELLY-FRYE

TO

DEPENDENCY

In addition to its failure to adequately define scientific process, the Amber B. court applied Kelly-Frye to dependency
hearings without fully considering the distinction between dependency hearings and criminal trials. l03 In determining that the
95. [d.
96. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
97. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1987).
98. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
100. FED. R. EVID. 703 ("If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not
be admissible in evidence. ")
101. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966).
102. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 Cal. Law Rev. Commission'8 comment (West 1966).
103. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text and infra notes 113-14 and ac-
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holding in Cheryl H. needed to be reconsidered, the Amber B.
court relied heavily upon Bledsoe and Shirley.104 Cheryl H.,
however, was a dependency hearing, while both Bledsoe and
Shirley were criminal cases.
In Bledsoe, .the court's main concern was whether the evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome was reliable in determining
whether "a rape in a legal sense has, in fact, occurred."lOIi Although Bledsoe did not specifically layout the reasons for applying the Kelly-Frye standard,106 its application and necessity
for judicial restraint were generally in line with People v.
Kelly.107
The Kelly court applied the Frye general acceptance standard of admissibility to evidence based on voiceprints. In applying the standard, the court stated that the criticism of the Frye
standard was that the test was "too conservative, often resulting
in the prevention of the admission of relevant evidence. "108 The
Kelly court found the conservative nature of the test to be its
primary advantage in criminal cases and that the "[e]xercise of
restraint is especially warranted when the identification technique is offered to identify the perpetrator of a crime."109
Following Bledsoe, several criminal cases did allow expert
testimony regarding child sexual abuse and these cases did not
require Kelly-Frye. llo The Amber B. court distinguished these
cases from Bledsoe based on the fact that the evidence was limited to a discussion of the victims as a class and not as evidence
of the commission of a crime or the identification of the perpetrator.lll The court went on to say that the issue could not be
avoided in Amber B. because the expert gave a direct opinion
that Amber had been molested.ll2 At this point, the court
companying text.
104. See supra notes 64·67 and accompanying text.
105. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 248, 681 P.2d 291, 299, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
458 (1984).
106. Id. at 247 n.7, 681 P.2d at 298 n.7, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457 n.7.
107. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
110. See cases cited supra note 34.
111. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 689·90, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627·28 (1987).
112; Id. at 689, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
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equated a determination of abuse in a dependency hearing with
the identification and commission of a crime in a criminal case.
They are not the same. A determination of abuse in a dependency hearing results in the child being placed under court protection,113 while the identification of a perpetrator in a criminal
trial can subject that person to imprisonment. l l•
In one of the criminal cases, People v. Roscoe,11II the court
noted that "[l]ess strict rules of admissibility apply where child
abuse is an issue in noncriminal cases, such as Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency proceedings. "116 The
Amber B. court pointed out that Roscoe did not cite any authority and, therefore, it did not survive scrutiny.ll7 In stating
that Kelly-Frye applied in dependency hearings, the Amber B.
court's reasoning was short and simple: 1) Welfare and Institutions Code section 355118 requires evidence legally admissible in
trial of civil cases; 2) Kelly-Frye has been applied in civil trials;1l9 therefore, Kelly-Frye applies in dependency hearings.l2O
The court's cursory analysis fails to take into consideration that
statutes and case law have made evidentiary exceptions in dependency hearings and that the Kelly-Frye test has been historically applied in criminal trials. In fact, the case which the court
cites to support its argument that Kelly-Frye has been applied
in civil cases is a paternity suit, more akin to a criminal trial in
that the purpose is to identify a person responsible for an act. I i i
See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
[d. at 1100 n.4, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.4.
Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1988). The statute states:
[A)ny matter or information relevant and material to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring [the child)
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and
may be received in evidence. However, proof by a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases
must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by § 300.
Section 701 additionally provides that "[t)he admission and exclusion of evidence shall
be pursuant to the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and by judicial
decision." (West 1984).
119. Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966)
(court held that evidence regarding blood grouping in paternity proceedings must meet
the Kelly-Frye test to be admissible).
120. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
121. Huntingdon, 64 Cal. 2d. 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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Despite Roscoe's lack of citing authorities, support can be
found elsewhere for the idea that the conservative and stricter
criterion of admissibility required by Kelly-Frye might be necessary in criminal proceedings122 but unwarranted in dependency
hearings. 123 In dependency hearings, the safety and welfare of
the child is paramount. 124 Statutes and judicial decisions have
recognized this important social policy by creating exceptions in
the rules of admissibility for dependency hearings.
The Evidence Code generally prohibits the admission of
character evidence. 1211 In dependency hearings, however, a statutory exception has been created allowing evidence that a parent
or guardian abused another minor.126 Another exception allows
the hearsay reports of probation officers. 127 In addition, the
122. See People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986) in which
the court held that expert testimony regarding CSAAS did not need to meet the KellyFrye test when offered to rehabilitate the credibility of the claimant witness. The court's
reasoning for not applying Kelly-Frye in this criminal case was that the evidence was not
being offered to prove the commission of a crime or identify the perpetrator. Had it
been, the court would have imposed the test.
123. See In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987) in which a New York
court held admissible testimony of an expert regarding child's conduct with anatomical
dolls to corroborate child's out-of-court statements. [d. at 327. In discussing whether this
evidence would meet the Frye standard, the court stated that "an overriding point to
remember [was) that Family Court child protective proceedings were civil, rather than
criminal, in nature and that it is therefore appropriate to err on the side of admissibility...when it comes to the introduction of evidence derived from new clinical testing
techniques . . . . " [d. at 332.
124. See In re Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d 414, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986) (in depen-.
dency hearings evidence code should be interpreted in light of paramount purpose to
protect welfare of the child); Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47, 141 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1977) (purpose to protect and promote welfare of child); In re Raya, 255 Cal. App.
2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967) (welfare of child paramount concern); People v. Fifield,
136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955) (juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials
but in nature of guardian proceedings). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE section 300
(West Supp. 1988) (operative Jan. 1, 1988 & operative Jan. 1, 1990) (the intent of the
Legislature in enacting section 300 is to provide maximum protection for children who
are sexually abused.
125. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1988) ("evidence of a person's character.. .is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.")
126. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.l(b) (West Supp. 1988); see In re Dorothy I.,
162 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 209 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1984) (in a dependency hearing, psychiatrist
permitted to testify that there was substantial danger posed to the child as result of
abusive conduct of the father toward minor's sibling, regardless of Evidence Code section
1101, which prohibits character evidence); In re Marianne R., 113 Cal. App. 3d 423, 169
Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980) (in a proceeding to maintain placement of the child in foster care,
evidence concerning the father's prior sexual conduct with his stepdaughter held admissible, regardless of the admissibility of this evidence in a criminal trial).
127. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 281 (West 1984).
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fourth amendment exclusionary rule relating to unlawfully
seized evidence has been determined to be inapplicable in dependency hearings because of the potential harm to children in
allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment. 128 Furthermore, the sixth amendment right to confront the witness is
not considered absolute in civil cases and in particular, dependency hearings. Because the child's welfare is paramount, confrontation of the minor witness by the parent's counsel may be
done in the judge's chambers, outside the presence of the parents. 129 The legislature has also created a legal presumption that
certain children come within the jurisdiction of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. lS0 This presumption establishes a
prima facie case for dependency when the court finds, upon
competent professional evidence, that an injury or detrimental
condition exists, that is of such a nature as would not be ordinarily sustained except through abuse. lsl
Another difference between dependency hearings and other
civil proceedings and criminal trials is that dependency hearings,
as a function of the court's equitable jurisdiction, are not heard
in the presence of a jury. The Amber B. court states that the
underlying purpose of the Kelly-Frye test is to prevent the
factfinder from being misled by the "aura of infallibility" that
may surround unproven scientific methods. ls2 This may be necessary in a criminal or civil proceeding when the factfinder IS
128. In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978).
129. Seering v. Department of Social Serv., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422
(1987) (in administrative hearing regarding suspension of day care license, victim allowed
to testify in chambers because of trauma and fear of testifying in front of alleged perpetrator, held not to violate statutory and due process rights to confront witness); In re
Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729 (1986) (father's right to
confrontation adequately protected by counsel's cross examination in chambers, outside
presence of father); See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350(b) (West Supp. 1988) (testimony
of the child may be taken in chambers, outside the presence of the parents if the court
determines it is necessary to ensure truthfulness, if the minor is intimidated by the court
setting, or the child is afraid to testify in front of the parents).
130. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West Supp. 1988). The presumption is one
affecting the burden of proof, not a presumption affecting the production of evidence. [d.
at § 355.1(c). This statute replaced an earlier statute which one court interpreted as only
affecting the production of evidence. See In re James B., 166 Cal. App. 3d 934, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 778 (1985) (presumption only survived until the parents presented rebuttal
evidence).
131. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West Supp. 1988). The statute also states
that testimony by a parent in a section 300 proceeding is inadmissible as evidence in
other actions. [d. at § 355.l(d).
132. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987).
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typically a jury. With a jury, there may be a greater possibility
of abuse relative to the weight of evidence than there would be if
a judge were the trier of fact.133 But, in dependency hearings,
the factfinder is always a judge lS' who, through his or her experience of hearing numerous expert witnesses, would tend to be less
impressed with the opinion of the expert than a lay juror. The
Kelly-Frye test removes the question of the evidence's reliability
from the discretion of the judge. 131i
The Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility has been criticized
by commentators for preventing the admission of relevant evidence. 136 The critics state that the goals of the test, such as providing uniformity and shielding the factfinder from the tendency
to treat the evidence as infallible, can be obtained through other
alternatives. 137 Some jurisdictions have modified the test by
adopting a substantial acceptance test rather than the general
acceptance test. 138 Others allow evidence regarding the general
acceptance for purposes of determining the weight of the evidence but not for the purpose of exclusion. 13s Several jurisdictions have rejected the test completely and rely on traditional
133. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 60 (3d ed. 1984) (UUudges'J professional experience in valuing evidence greatly lessens the need for exclusionary rules.")
134. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no federal constitutional right
to jury trial in juvenile court cases).
135. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
136. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976); Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 690 n.4, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629 n.4; see MCCORMICK, supra note 133 at §§ 203-06; Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980)
(article details the lengthy and controversial history of the Frye test and the author
accepts the premise of Frye, at least in criminal cases, but rejects the standard as
unworkable).
137. See, MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at § 203 at 608 (author states that the Frye
standard should be substituted with a substantial acceptance test which would allow any
relevant conclusions supported by qualified expert witness to be admitted unless there
are distinct reasons for exclusion, such as unfair prejudice); Giannelli supra note 136, at
1248 (author advocates a procedure in which the proponent would be required to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
trials and by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil trial).
138. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at § 203 at 606.
139. [d. See People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975). The
court agreed generally with the purpose of the Kelly-Frye standard, but in holding that
the trial court did not err in not applying the standard, the court stated, U[wJe do not
believe that under all the circumstances of this case the standard of 'general acceptance
by recognized experts in the field' is determinative of the admissibility-as distinguished
from weight-of the evidence in this case." [d. at 109-10, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
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standards of relevance and expertise. 140
Cheryl H. recognized the need to protect the child and permitted expert testimony to address the issue of whether the
child had been abused and needed court protection.141 The court
did not allow this evidence to prove the commission of a crime
or to identify the actual perpetrator. 142 By limiting the evidence
solely to the determination of whether the child was in danger
and in need of protection, the judicial restraint of Kelly was not
required. Under Cheryl H., the judge had adequate safeguards
to limit or exclude the evidence if necessary. The evidence could
be excluded if irrelevant,143 or if the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. 144

VI. CONCLUSION
As the Amber B. court states, it is particularly difficult to
determine at what point evidence of psychological analysis of
behavior transcends expert testimony and becomes scientific evidence. To this elusive question, the court offers little clarification. It imposes a test based on how likely the factfinder is to be
awed by the evidence. Had the court defined scientific process
based on the nature of the evidence, it is doubtful that the use
of anatomical dolls or the analysis of the child's report of abuse
would be considered scientific processes requiring Kelly-Frye.
The dolls are a tool to facilitate a meaningful exchange between
the therapist and child, and they aid the therapist in forming his
or her opinion as to whether the child has been abused. They are
not a scientific process whereby data is inserted and quantifiable
results emerge.
140. MCCORMICK, supra note 133 at § 203 at 607. See Giannelli supra note 136. The
author states that the current status of the Frye test is difficult to assess and the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence, although adopted by twenty-two jurisdictions adds no
clarity, because the Rules, the Advisory Committee's Notes and legislative history are
silent on whether the Rules supersede or incorporate the Frye standard. [d. at 122S-30.
The author further reports that jurisdictions are split but that it is likely that more
courts will reject the Frye standard in favor of alternative approaches. [d. at 1231.
141. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 109S, 1116-1S, 200 Cal. Rptr. 7S9, SOO-Ol
(1984).
142. [d. at IllS, 200 Cal. Rptr. at SOL
143. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 350-351 (West 1966).
144. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/7

24

Dulka: Evidence

1988]

467

EVIDENCE

In dependency hearings, the ultimate goal is the welfare and
safety of the child. The social policy of preventing continued
and future harm to the child demands that all relevant evidence
be presented and that the judge be given a wide latitude of discretion in determining what evidence is admissible. The additional requirement of reliability as imposed by the Kelly-Frye
standard may be necessary in criminal cases before juries, but is
unwarranted in dependency hearings. The previous safeguards
of Cheryl H.146 prevented the evidence from being used to identify the perpetrator, but allowed the evidence to determine
whether an abuse had occurred for the limited purpose of determining whether the child was in danger. Unfortunately, the Amber B. court has chosen to erect yet another barrier in the already difficult task of protecting sexually abused children.
Matthew J. Dulka*

145. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789.

* Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1989.
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